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ARTICLES

The "Inviolate Personality" -Warren

and Brandeis After One Hundred Years:
Introduction to a Symposium on the
Right of Privacy
SHELDON W. HALPERN*

That the individual shall have full protection in person and in
property is a principle as old as the common law; but it has
been found necessary from time to time to define anew the
exact nature and extent of such protection. Political, social,
and economic changes entail the recognition of new rights,
and the common law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the
demands of society.'
There is a clear consensus that "[t]he common law right of privacy
was conceived in the late nineteenth century by the fertile intellects
of Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, and was born on the pages
of the Harvard Law Review ' 2 in an article entitled simply The Right
to Privacy.' One hundred years ago, these two young Boston lawyers,
protesting against an intrusive press,4 struck a major chord that
Professor of Law, The Ohio State University College of Law. B.A. 1957,
Cornell University; L.L.B. 1959, Cornell University.
1. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890).
2. Zimmerman, False Light Invasion of Privacy: The Light That Failed, 64
N.Y.U. L. REv. 364, 365 (1989).
Warren and Brandeis were convinced that individuals ought to have legal
power to control dissemination of information about themselves when that
information related to nonpublic aspects of their lives and, consequently,
developed a tort theory to protect that selective anonymity.
Id. See also Felcher & Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayalof Real People
by the Media, 88 YAIE L.J. 1577, 1581 (1979) (suggesting that Warren and Brandeis,
"in the process of searching for [such a common law right], succeeded in inventing
it"').
3. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1.
4. For a discussion of the background and context of the article, see J.T.
McCARTHY, THE RIOHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY (1987) § 1.3; Barron, Warren
and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890): Demystifying a
Landmark Citation, 13 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 875 (1979); Glancy, The Invention of the
Right to Privacy, 21 Amuz. L. REv. 1 (1979).
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continues to reverberate today, with overtones creating complexities
that the courts continually struggle to resolve.5 The profound influence of their article has served not only as a beacon for the legal
scholar who hopes for a similar impact 6 but as justification for that
American peculiarity, the law review. It "has come to be regarded
as the outstanding example of the influence of legal periodicals upon
the American law."' It has been, and remains, a source of considerable scholarly dispute. "Depending upon the biases of the viewer,
the article's effect could be said to exemplify the power, the impotence, or even the perniciousness of legal scholarship." 8
What commands less of a consensus than the genesis of the
right of privacy is the characterization of that common law right,
both as its progenitors perceived it and as it has come to be
understood today. Professor Anita Allen 9 offers this symposium a
feminist perspective on both the history of the Warren and Brandeis
right-"the brainchild of nineteenth-century men of privilege . . ."10 -and the modern function of that century old creation.
Noting that "one hundred years after the Warren and Brandeis
5. See, e.g., Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603 (1989).
6. As Professor Turkington observed:
The [Warren and Brandeis] article has acquired a special place in the
fantasies of those who toil in the dusty basements of law libraries or sit
bleary-eyed in front of a computer screen researching and writing with the
hope that their efforts will produce insights that will dramatically shape
legal history.
Turkington, Legacy of the Warren and Brandeis Article: The Emerging Unencumbered Constitutional Right to Informational Privacy, 10 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 479, 482
(1990).
7. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 384 (1960). The Warren and
Brandeis article has been called "that unique law review article which launched a
tort." Bloustein, Privacy, Tort Law, and the Constitution: Is Warren and Brandeis'
Tort Petty and Unconstitutionalas Well?, 46 TEx. L. REv. 611, 612 (1968) and "that
most influential law review article of all," Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were
Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 327 (1966).
8. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and
Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291 (1983). Professor Zimmerman was
concerned that "[t]he confusion that has attended the effort to create a firm legal
contour for the tort merely reflects the inherent difficulty under the first amendment
of treating truthful speech as tortious ....

."

Id. at 293. This concern caused her to

ask "Is it possible that the seemingly elegant vessel that Warren and Brandeis set
afloat ...

is in fact a leaky ship which should at long last be scuttled?" Id. at 294.

See also Kalven, supra note 7; Posner, John A. Sibley Lecture: The Right of Privacy,
12 GA. L. REv. 393 (1978). Cf. Zuckman, Invasion of Privacy-Some Communicative
Torts Whose Time Has Gone, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 253, 259-61 (1990).
9. Allen, How Privacy Got Its Gender, 10 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 441 (1990).
10. Id. at 441.
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article, legal discussions of the privacy tort are largely silent about
the social reality of gender bias and its impact on privacy law. .... ,
Professor Allen urges the courts to "turn self-consciously to the
' 2
gender factor in privacy tort cases.'
Whether considered farsighted revolutionaries or conventional
and conservative men of their times, 3 Warren and Brandeis attempted to carve out an interest-viewed by some as a "personality
interest"' 14 and by others in more proprietary terms' 5-without concomitantly attempting a clear description of that interest. 6 "Privacy" is an elusive concept; the word connotes an array of values,
thoughts, and emotions that are enormously difficult to objectify,
notwithstanding the fact that each of us, subjectively, can relate to
it:
The word "privacy" has taken on so many different meanings
and connotations in so many different legal and social contexts that it has largely ceased to convey any single coherent
concept. Instant recognition of content is not provided by
the "privacy" label. Most people will readily agree that they
should have a "right of privacy." But when pressed for a
definition, they will give widely varying responses ....
It is apparent that the word "privacy" has proven to be a
powerful rhetorical battle cry in a plethora of unrelated
contexts. . . . Like the emotive word "freedom," "privacy"
means so many different things to so many different people
that it has lost any precise legal connotation that it might
17
once have had.
The result of this definitional uncertainty has been a multilevelled confusion. First there is the confusion of homophony: we
refer both to the "privacy" tort and to the purported constitutional
"right of privacy"; the former encompasses an individual's claim
11. Id. at 469.
12. Id. at 477.
13. Id. at 466.
14. See, e.g., S. HALPERN, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION, PRIVACY, PUBLICITY AND
"MORAL RIGHTS" 386 (1988).
15. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 8; Prosser, supra note 7.
16. "Unfortunately, the learned authors were not as successful in describing
the interest ... as in saying what it was not .... " Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect
of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962, 970 (1964).
17. J.T. McCARTHY, supra note 4, at 1-3, 5-58. "The phrase 'a right of privacy'
as used in law has almost as many meanings as Hydra had heads." Zimmerman,
supra note 2, at 364.
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against another who, in exercising an otherwise lawful right, impinges upon that individual, while the latter refers to an individual's
rights as against an intrusive government." It has been suggested
that, as originally propounded, the personality interest embraced by
the Warren and Brandeis tort is centered on individual anonymity
with respect to others, as opposed to the constitutional right's
concern with citizen autonomy with respect to the government. 19
For most purposes we make a clear distinction between the tort
and the constitutional right. 20 Nevertheless, while on the Supreme
Court, and long after publication of his article, Justice Brandeis
appeared to favor a synthesis of these disparate aspects of the idea
of privacy into a unitary concept, referring to a constitutional "right
to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men." 2' Professor Richard Turkington, in his
18. See generally J.T. McCARg HY, supra note 4, at § 5.7 for a discussion of
this "constitutional privacy right." As Professor McCarthy has noted:
Further semantic confusion as to the legal meaning of the word "privacy"
is created by the fact that, starting in the 1960s, the United States Supreme
Court has used the word "privacy" as a shorthand label for a cluster of
fundamental constitutional rights of citizens against various forms of governmental intrusion.
Id. at 1-4.
19. Zimmerman, supra note 2, at 364-65. Professor Zimmerman stated:
In modern constitutional law, privacy may refer to freedom from illegal
governmental searches as well as to preservation of individual choice in
matters relating to family life or human sexuality. The common thread
uniting these forms of constitutional right to privacy is the claim that each
citizen has a right of autonomy-a right to decide how to live and to
associate with others, free from all but the most carefully limited impingements by governmental authority.... For the past century, the common
law, too, has identified and attempted to protect interests in privacy....
Although schematic in form, their [the Warren and Brandeis) idea of privacy
had not so much to do with citizen autonomy as it did with an interest in
what might be called selective anonymity. Warren and Brandeis were convinced that individuals ought to have legal power to control dissemination
of information about themselves when that information related to nonpublic
aspects of their lives and, consequently, developed a tort theory to protect
that selective anonymity.
Id.
20. See, e.g., J.T. McCARTHY, supra note 4, at § 5.7. Professor McCarthy
observes that "such 'Constitutional privacy' in the context of governmental intrusion
into private decision making is far afield from 'privacy' in tort law" (Id. at 1-4) and
concludes "that the only significant thing that the Constitutional right of privacy
and the common law right of privacy share is the label." (Id. at 5-55).
21. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
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symposium article 2 2 elaborates upon this linkage between the tort
23
and constitutional privacy rights.
Second, and more significant, 24 is the conceptual disarray over
the nature and extent of the tort itself, the personality-invasive acts
with which Warren and Brandeis principally were concerned. It is in
the latter context-understanding and formulating the cause of
action that Warren and Brandeis first postulated-that there has
been the most heat and the most diffracted light. The controversy is
perhaps best exemplified by the distinctive works of Dean William
25
Prosser and Dr. Edward Bloustein.
Prosser attempted to rationalize the body of law that had
developed during the first seven decades following publication of
the Warren and Brandeis article. Seeking a unifying structure, Prosser created instead in 1960 a quadrupedal right of privacy as he
postulated four distinct torts invasive of "privacy," rather than one
tort directed to a single interest. 26 Prosser's theory of distinctive
branches off a common privacy root-the "intrusion," "embarrass-

ing). See, e.g., Bloustein, supra note 16, at 975-77: "[B]randeis believed, at the time
he wrote his dissent [in Olmstead], that the fourth amendment was intended to
protect the very principle of 'inviolate personality' which he had earlier suggested
was the principle underlying the common law right to privacy." Id. at 977. See also
A. ALLEN, UNEAsY AccEss: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FRE E SOCIETY (1988) in which
Professor Allen attempts to use the idea of an individual's right to limit "access" as
a unifying concept. As Warren and Brandeis had acknowledged, the phrase "the
right to be let alone" was first used by Judge Cooley in COOLEY, TORTS 29 (2d ed.
1888). See Prosser, supra note 7, at 389.
22. Turkington, supra note 6.
23. Id.
24. Ultimately, the first area of confusion can be dealt with by the use of
appropriate, albeit cumbersome, prefatory phrases to distinguish the different privacy
rights.
25. Edward Bloustein, who died in December 1989, was, for many years
preceding his death, the president of Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey. A
1959 graduate of the Cornell Law School, his legal academic career began at New
York University Law School. Although he wrote significant work in the field of
privacy during his years on the N.Y.U. faculty, Dr. Bloustein's scholarly output
continued during his long tenure as president of a large state university system and
indeed up to the time of his death. Dr. Bloustein was to have been a contributor to
this symposium as well as the principal speaker at the Defamation and Privacy
Section presentation at the January, 1990 meeting of the Association of American
Law Schools.
26. See Prosser, supra note 7. Dean Prosser maintained that the right of privacy
involves "not one tort, but a complex of four [different] interests ... tied together
by the common name, but otherwise ... [with] nothing in common." Id. at 389.
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Dean Prosser's analysis, while concededly "a source of some

confusion in the law," 29 has nevertheless survived, and "his influence
on the development of the law of privacy ... [rivals that of] Warren

and Brandeis." 30 One is hard put to find a case touching upon privacy

interests that does not go through the obligatory litany of casting the

issue in Prosser's terms, even if only then to discard the implications

of the distinctions. 3' Dean Prosser's analytic tool certainly has created
great conceptual problems.3 2 Not the least of the problems relate to
the economically and celebrity based "right of publicity," as much
judicial analysis has foundered on attempts to reconcile the interests
embraced by that right with the "appropriation" leg of Prosser's

privacy quadruped.33 Criticism of the Prosser model, however appro-

27. The separate "torts" are described by Dean Prosser as: "(1) Intrusion upon
the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude ...(2) Public disclosure of embarrassing private
facts ... (3) Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light ...(4) Appropriation,

for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiff's name or likeness." Id. at 389.
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977). Dean Prosser had been
the Reporter for that section in the earlier years of the revision process.
29. Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 834 (6th
Cir. 1983).
30. Bloustein, supra note 16, at 964.
31. See Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Commercial Exploitation of the
Associative Value of Personality, 39 VANe. L. REv. 1199, 1210 (1986) ("Dean
Prosser's extraordinary effort to articulate and codify the right of privacy has become
a straw man, to be raised, analyzed, distinguished, and dismissed.").
32. As then Professor Bloustein observed:
[T]he clear consequence of [Prosser's] view is that Warren and Brandeis
were wrong, and their analysis of the tort of privacy is a mistake .... If

Dean Prosser is correct, there is no "new tort" of invasion of privacy, there
are rather only new ways of committing "old torts." And if he is right, the
social value or interest we call privacy is not an independent one, but is
only a composite of the value our society places on protecting mental
tranquility, reputation and intangible forms of property.
Bloustein, supra note 16, at 965-66. See S. HALPERN, supra note 14, at 386 (1988):
Notwithstanding its appearance in opinions, almost as an obligatory prelude
to discussion of "privacy," there is serious doubt as to the utility and
validity of the Prosser quadrupedal analysis, particularly when one considers
the interests underlying the different causes of action .... It is perhaps

more useful to consider the "right of privacy" in terms of an individual's
interest in anonymity, the personality interest in freedom from exposure.
33. See Halpern, supra note 31, at 1205-11.
Commercialization of personality only recently has invaded our daily lives.
Courts, not surprisingly, examined early claims for economic injury from
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priate and necessary to the development of an independent right of
publicity, does not diminish Prosser's achievement in affording subto permit
stance to a legal complex that was perhaps too ephemeral
a4
effort.
that
of
absence
the
in
significant development
The historical "privacy" entanglements of the celebrity's economic interest in the exploitation of personality underlies Professor
Dorothy Glancy's study in this symposium. 5 Through the development of the privacy/publicity rights, Professor Glancy links the
personality interests of Bette Midler and her much earlier counterpart,
Marion Manola. I, and others, incline to the view that the right of
publicity, protecting the economic exploitative value of personality, is
quite distinct from the Prosser "appropriation" tort or other privacy
considerations.3 6 However, as Professor Glancy notes, there is "an
implicit theoretical background [of privacy doctrine] which helps to
explain and to justify why .. the3 a7law ought to recognize and protect
this particular form of property.
If one characterizes Prosser's contribution as that of seeking to
describe the body of the right of privacy, one may also say that
Bloustein sought its soul, and found it in Warren and Brandeis'
construct of the "inviolate personality." 38 In 1964, writing directly in
unwanted publicity in the light of societal attitudes associating that publicity
with the emotional distress flowing from violation of the right of privacy.
Unfortunately, in the current societal context in which commercialization of
celebrity is commonplace, the Prosser analysis "does not explain why
appropriation of personality may be described as the invasion of privacy
[citing Frazer, Appropriation of Personality-A New Tort?, 99 LAW Q.
REV. 281, 296 (1983)].
Id. at 1210 (footnotes omitted).
34. "That confusion has been rampant in this area is apparent from the cases
themselves; to attribute the confusion to the Prosser analysis is an oversimplification,
if not churlish." Id. (footnotes omitted). As Professor McCarthy has noted, "Prosser
defined the terms and even his critics were forced to communicate in the language
and categories he proposed." J.T. McCARTHY, supra note 4, at 1-19.
35. Glancy, Privacy and the Other Miss M, 10 N. ILL. U.L. REv. 401 (1990).
36. See, e.g., Halpern, supra note 31, at 1247-55. Indeed, such an approach is
not necessarily antithetical to Prosser's conceptualization of privacy. As Professor
Kwall has observed, "a careful reading of Prosser's article suggests that had the right
of publicity been an established legal doctrine at the time of his writing, he might
have been inclined to separate the appropriation tort from the other privacy torts."
Kwall, Is Independence Day Dawning for the Right of Publicity?, 17 U.C.D. L. REv.
191, 193 (1983) (footnote omitted).
37. Glancy, supra note 35, at 440 (footnote omitted).
38. "The principle which protects personal writings and all other personal
productions . .. against publication in any form, is in reality not the principle of
private property, but that of an inviolate personality." Warren & Brandeis, supra
note 1, at 205.
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response to the Prosser model, Bloustein proposed "a general theory
of individual privacy [to] reconcile the divergent strands of legal
development." 3 9 Believing "that the tort cases involving privacy are
of one piece and involve a single tort [and] a common thread of
principle, "40 Bloustein found that common thread in "the interest in
4
preserving individual dignity." '
Bloustein was concerned that Prosser's analytic dissection elided
the underlying and unifying interest that Warren and Brandeis had
sought to protect: "[T]he interest protected in each [of Prosser's
distinct 'torts'] is the same, it is human dignity and individuality or,
in Warren and Brandeis' words, 'inviolate personality."' 42 Concomitantly, the injury flowing from a violation of the personality "is to
our individuality, to our dignity as individuals, and the legal remedy
represents a social vindication of the human spirit thus threatened
rather than a recompense for the loss suffered. ' 43 Bloustein urged a
synthetic, rather than an analytic approach to a right of privacy
essential to freedom:
I take the principle of "inviolate personality" to posit the
individual's independence, dignity and integrity; it defines
man's essence as a unique and self-determining being .... I
believe that what provoked Warren and Brandeis to write their
article was a fear that a rampant press feeding on the stuff of
private life would destroy individual dignity and integrity and
emasculate individual freedom and independence. If this is so,
Dean Prosser's analysis of privacy stands clearly at odds with
"the most influential law review article ever published," one
39. Bloustein, supra note 16, at 963. This theme informed much of Dr.
Bloustein's later writing. See, e.g., E.J. BLOUSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP PRIVACY
(1979); Bloustein, Privacy, Tort Law, and the Constitution:Is Warren and Brandeis'
Tort Petty and Unconstitutional as Well? 46 TEx. L. REv. 611 (1968); Bloustein,
Privacy is Dear at Any Price: A Response to Professor Posner'sEconomic Theory,
12 GA. L. REv. 429 (1978).
40. Bloustein, supra note 16, at 1000.
41. Id. at 986.
42. Id.at 991.
If Dean Prosser is correct, there is no "new tort" of invasion of privacy,
there are rather only new ways of committing "old torts." And if he is
right, the social value or interest we call privacy is not an independent one,
but is only a composite of the value our society places on protecting mental
tranquility, reputation and intangible forms of property.
Id. at 965.
43. Id. at 1003.
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which gave rise to a "new tort," not merely to a fancy name
for "old torts.""
It was such a reading of Warren and Brandeis some fifty years
earlier that prompted the Georgia Supreme Court to begin the process
of judicial recognition of the common law right which that article
had urged. 45 With particular reference to the New York Court of
46
Appeals' explicit rejection of such a right a few years earlier,
Georgia's Judge Cobb remarked: "So thoroughly satisfied are we that
the law recognizes . .. the right of privacy . . . that we venture to
predict that the day will come when the American bar will marvel
that a contrary view was ever entertained by judges of eminence and
ability .... ,,47
It is easy, in a profusion of academic arguments, to trivialize the
fundamental values lying at the core of the privacy construct. In
making distinctions, however helpful that process is to our better
understanding, we must also keep hold of the greater motivating
forces.
The words we use to identify and describe basic human values
are necessarily vague and ill-defined. Compounded of profound human hopes and longings on the one side and elusive
aspects of human psychology and experience on the other, our
social goals are more fit to be pronounced by prophets and
44. Bloustein, supra note 16, at 970 (footnotes omitted).
45. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
46. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
The court dismissed the Warren and Brandeis argument:
An examination of the authorities leads us to the conclusion that the socalled "right of privacy" has not as yet found an abiding place in our
jurisprudence, and ... the doctrine cannot now be incorporated without
doing violence to settled principles of law by which the profession and the
public have long been guided.
Id. at 556, 64 N.E. at 447.
47. Pavesich, 122 Ga. at 220, 50 S.E. at 80-81. The New York court's nonrecognition gave rise, subsequently, to legislative action creating a statutory right of
privacy. See N.Y. Civ. RIGiTs LAW, §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1986). The
Georgia/New York split was reflected in divergent approaches to the right of privacy
in other jurisdictions, as some responded judicially and some legislatively; in any
event, it now appears that every state recognizes, through common law or by statute,
some form of privacy action. See Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d
70, 82 (W. Va. 1984). See also J.T. MCCARTHY, supra note 4, Ch. 6, for a review
of the various state responses.
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poets than by professors. We are fortunate, then, that some
of our judges enjoy a touch of the prophet's vision and the
poet's tongue ....
[T]he law's vocabulary of mind is exceedingly limited [but] Justice Brandeis and Judge Cobb help us
see ... that the interest served in the privacy cases is in some
sense a spiritual interest rather than an interest in property or
reputation. Moreover, they also help us understand that the
spiritual characteristic which is at issue is not a form of
trauma, mental illness or distress, but rather individuality or
freedom."
Paramount both to Warren and Brandeis and to the Bloustein
perspective on privacy was concern over a technology threatening to
create new and sophisticated breaches in the wall of anonymity:
[S]cientific and technological advances have raised the spectre
of new and frightening invasions of privacy. Our capacity as
a society to deal with the impact of this new technology
depends, in part, on the degree to which we can assimilate the
threat it poses to the settled ways our legal institutions have
developed for dealing with similar threats in the past. 49
This theme is explored by Professor George Trubow in his
symposium article on the place of "informational privacy" in the
overall privacy schema.50 Professor Trubow urges recognition of a
right to inhibit dissemination of compiled data as a necessary modern
extension of the Warren and Brandeis approach to the individual's
right of privacy. He proposes specific legislative and judicial means
to accomplish that recognition' and to shape the tort to be responsive
to the realities of new technology." Professor Richard Turkington,
similarly concerned with "informational privacy," focuses upon privacy-based constraints on governmental dissemination of private information, urging an "unencumbered constitutional right to
informational privacy" as a direct outgrowth of the Warren and
Brandeis privacy construct.5 2
Much of the work of both Prosser and Bloustein creating the
analytic and the conceptual foundations for our thinking about pri48. Bloustein, supra note 16, at 1002.
49. Id. at 963.

50. Trubow, Protecting Informational Privacy in the Information Society, 10

N. ILL. U.L. REv. 521 (1990).
51. Id.

52. Turkington, supra note 6.
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vacy antedated the complex of Supreme Court opinions, beginning in
1964 with New York Times v. Sullivan,53 that have "constitutionalized" much of the law relating to communicative torts. The extension
of first amendment concerns to the privacy tort, and particularly to
actions relating to public disclosure of truthful but embarrassing
matter,5 4 has raised serious question about the modern viability of
Warren and Brandeis' central proposition."
Citing Warren and Brandeis, the Supreme Court has said that
"powerful arguments can be made and have been made, that however
it may be ultimately defined, there is a zone of privacy surrounding
every individual, a zone within which the State may protect him from
,"16 Although the Supreme Court has7
intrusion by the press ....
'
of such a "zone of privacy, "
recognition
articulate
continued to
these sentiments have been dicta, uttered in a context in which the
Court found the balance against the privacy interest." A complex and
serious problem is presented when the right of an individual to keep
his or her personality "inviolate," truly "to be let alone," conflicts
with what is perceived to be the first amendment right of a publisher
to keep the public aware and informed of that which otherwise would
be secret.5 9 Resolution, such as it is, has taken the form of a
particularly delicate balance, prompting judicial caution. As Justice
Marshall observed in Florida Star v. B.J.F.:6

53. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See Halpern, Of Libel, Language, and Law: New

York Times v. Sullivan at Twenty-Five, 68 N.C.L. REv. 273 (1990).

54. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603 (1989); Cox Broadcasting Corp.
v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
55. See, e.g., Zimmerman, supra note 8; Zuckman, supra note 8. Cf. Bloustein,
Privacy, Tort Law, and the Constitution: Is Warren and Brandeis' Tort Petty and
Unconstitutionalas Well? 46 TEx. L. REv. 611 (1968).
56. Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 487 (1975) (White, J.) (footnote omitted).
57. "We do not hold that truthful publication is automatically constitutionally
protected, or that there is no zone of personal privacy within which the State may
protect the individual from intrusion by the press." Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. 2603,
2613 (1989). (Marshall, J.). Justice Marshall would not "rule out the possibility that,
in a proper case, imposing civil sanctions for publication of the name of a rape
victim might be so overwhelmingly necessary to advance [the state interest in
protecting the victim]." Id. at 2611.
58. See supra note 54.
59. As Justice White observed in Cox Broadcasting: "In this sphere of collision
between claims of privacy and those of the free press, the interests on both sides are
plainly rooted in the traditions and significant concerns of our society." 420 U.S. at
491 (White, J.).
60. 109 S. Ct. 2603 (1989).
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We continue to believe that the sensitivity and significance of
the interests presented in clashes between First Amendment
and privacy rights counsel relying on limited principles that
sweep no more broadly than the appropriate context of the
6
instant case. '
Notwithstanding its refusal to make an absolute rule, the Court's
refusal to recognize the privacy interest in FloridaStar, an extremely
compelling plaintiff's case, "seems to leave little vitality in the tort
62
of disclosure of private facts.'
[T]he Court accepts [an] invitation ... to obliterate one of
the most note-worthy legal inventions of the 20th-Century: the
tort of the publication of private facts ....
Even if the Court's
opinion does not say as much today, such obliteration will
follow inevitably from the Court's conclusion here. If the First
Amendment prohibits wholly private persons . . . from recovering for the publication of the fact that she was raped, I
doubt that there remain any "private facts" which persons
may assume will not be published in the newspapers, or
63
broadcast on television.
If this observation by Justice White is accurate, if indeed there
remains today only an extremely constricted "zone of privacy,'"' then
little also is left of the concept of "inviolate personality" that
informed the Warren and Brandeis ideal of a right to privacy. At
issue is the core human conflict of a democratic society, as the interest
in human dignity-one essential attribute of freedom-collides with
that other great attribute of freedom, the interest in openness and
free dissemination of ideas. 65 The passage of a century since the great
articulation of the right of privacy as an attribute of the "inviolate
personality" need not mark the end of that right. Rather, time and
61. Id. at 2609 (Marshall, J.).
62. Anderson, Tortious Speech, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 71, 90 (1990). "The
Court insisted it was leaving open the possibility that publication of a rape victim's
name might be actionable under some circumstances, but if B.J.F. was not such a
case, it is difficult to imagine a case that would be actionable." Id.
63. Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2618 (White, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
64. Cf. Zuckman, supra note 8, who argues that "the interest protected by
Warren and Brandeis' tort is insubstantial" (Id. at 261) and that "[it was conceived
in irrational anger and should die with few . . . mourning its passing." (Id. at 265).
65. Cf. Ingber, Defamation: A Conflict Between Reason and Decency, 65 VA.
L. REv. 785 (1979); lngber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73
CALiF.

L. REv. 772 (1985).
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technology, judicial reflection and synthesis may have prepared us
now to integrate the great interests. The possibility of integration is
not so much dependent upon our ability to construct an appropriate
first amendment theory as it is upon the more intractable concern
with judicial capability to cope with questions of editorial judgement.
The legal constructs may be too fragile to work effectively in this
environment. Conversely, we may perhaps be ready for a sharpened
focus, with enhanced sophistication and an appreciation of the complexities of the policy determinations, to find an effective way to
harmonize two great but conflicting principles, each essential to the
maintenance of a society in which both dignity and freedom may
flourish.

